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ABSTRACT 
Redefining State Sovereignty: International Tribunals and Human Rights  
Carissa Rae Fry 
 
 In the current nation-state system state sovereignty is often seen as a way for state officials to 
escape accountability. International tribunals in the 20th century have helped deliver 
accountability in certain regions: but how is state sovereignty affected by the formation of these 
tribunals? While new concepts such as the Responsibility to Protect have created the idea of a 
“contingent sovereignty” within the human rights regime, do tribunals replicate this line of 
thinking? What aspects of sovereignty have changed over time and which ones have been 
retained within the regime? To what extent do criminal tribunals represent a limitation on state 
sovereignty? My thesis evaluates and answers the question of how the jurisdiction of these 
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Introduction 
The growth of the human rights regime and the formation of international criminal 
tribunals have challenged traditional aspects of state sovereignty. Using Schmitt's definition of 
sovereignty as a reference, the inquiry at hand will evaluate to what extent criminal tribunals 
represent a limitation on state sovereignty on some countries and not others, and examine which 
aspects of state sovereignty have been maintained in these tribunals and which have not. Thus 
the paper will assess whether or not a new conceptualization of sovereignty is evolving within 
the human rights regime with the formation of international tribunals. 
 The inquiry of this paper will be limited in scope to three tribunals, the International 
Military Tribunal, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, and the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. I choose to include the International Military 
Tribunal since it represents a basis for the further creation of such tribunals and because it was an 
important step for the human rights movement in creating accountability for major crimes, 
although the term genocide had yet to be coined at the time of the trials. The ICTY and ICTR 
were important to include because they were established by the UN to prosecute crimes that were 
prosecuted at Nuremberg. Due to the fact that they were established by the UN and are not 
treaty-based they are important to analyze because they would have greater implications on state 
sovereignty than courts that are treaty-based. It is for this reason that I chose not to include the 
International Criminal Court and International Court of Justice in my research.  
 In order to analyze how these tribunals (re)define sovereignty it is necessary to 
investigate the ways in which sovereignty has been defined, and the ways in which it has 
changed so as to be used in current governments and nation-states. The Treaty of Westphalia was 
written in 1648 to end religious conflict in Europe and established areas with “single overriding 
  2 
authorities”.1 These authorities were the ruling powers in states2, and the treaty developed a 
“hands-off” conception of sovereignty, that author Jackson Nyamuya Maogoto refers to as an 
“iron curtain-like” version of state sovereignty.3 This version of sovereignty prevented 
interference from other state powers over areas that each authority was acknowledged to have 
control and power over. This version of non-interference meant that accountability was not 
enforced by outside sources from other areas or territories. This meant, that unlike modern day 
conceptions of sovereignty authority figures were only accountable to those within their territory 
and not to other rulers or persons outside of their own territories (at least in theory). Notably, 
Maogoto claimed that “the post–World War II international trials pierced the Westphalian veil of 
sovereignty by directly challenging and trumping the dictates of national law”.4 The inquiry of 
this paper will be to evaluate whether or not this claim is true for all three tribunals and the way 
in which they were established and whether or not it was merely the Westphalian version of 
sovereignty that was impacted by the human rights regime.  
William Rasch calls Hobbes “the most interesting and influential early-modern 
philosopher of sovereignty”.5 Hobbes’ state of nature is one in which man is inherently in a state 
                                                
1 Maogoto, Jackson Nyamuya. "Westphalian Sovereignty in the Shadow of International Justice? A Fresh Coat of 
Paint for a Tainted Concept." Re-envisioning Sovereignty: The End of Westphalia? Ed. Trudy Jacobsen, Charles 
Sampford, and Ramesh Thakur. Aldershot, England: Ashgate, 2008. 211. ProQuest Ebrary. Web. 
<http://site.ebrary.com.ezproxy.cul.columbia.edu/lib/columbia/reader.action?docID=10218502>. 
(Henceforth Maogoto, Jackson Nyamuya. "Westphalian Sovereignty in the Shadow of International Justice?”.) 
 
2 "Treaty of Westphalia." The Avalon Project. Yale Law School, Web. 
<http://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_century/westphal.asp>. 
 
3 Maogoto, Jackson Nyamuya. "Westphalian Sovereignty in the Shadow of International Justice?.” 211.  
 
4 Maogoto, Jackson Nyamuya. "Westphalian Sovereignty in the Shadow of International Justice?.” 216. 
 
5 Rasch, William. "From Sovereign Ban to Banning Sovereignty." Giorgio Agamben: Sovereignty and Life. 
Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 2007. 101. Print. 
(Henceforth Rasch, William. "From Sovereign Ban to Banning Sovereignty.") 
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of war and conflict with one another.6 Individuals can enter into what Hobbes calls a “common-
wealth”, in order to overcome or supercede the state of nature, “to live peaceably amongst 
themselves, and be protected against other men”.7 Hobbes’ sovereignty seems, at a glance, to be 
in discord with conflict then, as entering into a common-wealth is intended to eradicate conflict 
between individuals. However, Hobbes still gives the sovereign power the right to enter into war 
“with other Nations”8. Of course, this right was intended to be used when it was for the good of 
the common-wealth or “publique good”.9 Indeed, it seems apparent that Rasch was correct when 
identifying Hobbes’ sovereignty as the most influential of early-modern philosophers, as this 
conception of a sovereign power is not much different from traditional views of modern 
sovereignty, in which governments (defined by their territory) could engage in war with other 
nation-states under the claim that it was to protect their own citizens. Indeed, we have seen that 
the relatively new concept of conflict outside of the traditional nation-state has meant an 
expansion of international law, such as the Geneva Conventions, so as to recognize non-state 
actors that may be engaged in conflict with recognized nation-states. This highlights the need for 
a re-defining moment for sovereignty and is one of the reasons I will choose a different working 
definition of sovereignty when analyzing the foundational documents that formulate international 
tribunals. 
                                                
6 Rasch, William. "From Sovereign Ban to Banning Sovereignty." 101. 
 
7 Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan. Vol. 2: The English and Latin Texts. Ed. Noel Malcolm. The Clarendon Edition of 
the Works of Thomas Hobbes, Vol. 4. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2012. 264. Oxford Scholarly Editions Online, 26 Sep. 
2013. Web. (Henceforth Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan.) 
 
8 Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan. 274.  
 
9 Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan. 274. 
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Carl Schmitt’s working definition of sovereignty is well-known, “ he who decides on the 
exception”10 is the person who is sovereign according to Schmitt. This definition has several 
important ramifications. One of the most important is that treating the sovereign as such means 
that this person or group has the authority to declare a state of exception when “normal” laws, 
rules, and codes of conduct are, for the time being anyway, not applicable under whatever 
circumstances it has been deemed fit to declare a state of exception. This definition is perhaps 
the most practical one, as it does not worry itself with defining boundaries or specified 
territories, or even nationalities for that matter. It hits at the heart of what it means to be a 
sovereign power: those who have the power to determine the guiding principles of those they 
have power over and decide when to change the state of affairs. Schmitt’s definition is the most 
useful when observing tribunals, as he explains that “the rule proves nothing; the exception 
proves everything”.11 The tribunals this paper will discuss certainly represent cases of exception 
and extraordinary circumstances, both by the crimes committed and by the legal proceedings 
following. I find Schmitt’s definition particularly useful in the current nation-state system 
because the “power”, governmental organization, or nation-state that decides what merits an 
exception is not always specifically codified in legal code. Particularly in the case at hand, when 
new tribunals and precedents are being established political pull seems to be an important and 
relevant aspect at play. Thus, utilizing this definition will provide a clearer basis for the inquiry 
at hand. 
Schmitt’s definition, at first glance, will not seem particularly different from that of a 
monarch in the time of Westphalia and is incompatible with the modern constitutionalist state. 
                                                
10 Schmitt, Carl. Political Theology Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty. Trans. George Schwab. Intro. 
George Schwab. Foreword Tracy B. Strong. Chicago and London: U of Chicago, 2005.5. Print. 
(Henceforth Schmitt, Carl. Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty. ) 
 
11 Schmitt, Carl. Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty. 15. 
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However, Schmitt “rescues” his definition of sovereignty by clarifying that the constitution of a 
state can “indicate who can act in such a case”12, speaking to a state of emergency in which a 
state of exception can be declared. Schmitt acknowledges that many philosophers posited the 
sovereign power with having received authority from a higher power, “everything in the 
nineteenth century was increasingly governed by conceptions of immanence”.13 By the time of 
Schmitt’s writing he claims that “most educated people” will no longer believe in a source of 
divine transcendence to instill power in the sovereign. He thus claims that most people will find 
a “positivist indifference toward any metaphysics” or a “more or less clear immanence-
pantheism”14 in their analysis of sovereign power. Indeed it seems that abandoning metaphysical 
considerations of sovereignty may be the most practical route, especially for scholars of human 
rights, who are more concerned with what a sovereign power can do than where the power of a 
given sovereign comes from.  
Schmitt’s definition thus serves us two purposes in our current inquiry- it allows us to 
analyze sovereignty in a way that is not outdated with the current political state, and also that it 
rids us from a number of metaphysical and logical considerations that other foundations of 
sovereignty would present us with. To discuss the sovereign as one who can decide on the 
exception, especially in regard to international tribunals and international law it seems pertinent 
and necessary to analyze the sovereign and the rule of law. Schmitt, and indeed a number of 
other philosophers such as Rasch, who uses Russell’s law of the excluded middle to explain 
“sovereign self-exemption”,15 recognize that the sovereign is both within and out of the law or 
                                                
12 Schmitt, Carl. Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty. 7. 
 
13 Schmitt, Carl.  Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty. 49. 
 
14 Schmitt, Carl. Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty. 50.  
15 Rasch, William. "From Sovereign Ban to Banning Sovereignty." 93. 
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legal order.16 This presents a logical problem, but yet again, Schmitt’s claim that the sovereign 
can decide on the exception means that the sovereign is “bound to the normally valid legal order 
but also transcended it”.17 This ability to transcend above the law is precisely what makes a 
sovereign power sovereign. It does not entirely solve the logical problem, but when the sovereign 
exercise the power of exception, the “normally valid legal order” is no longer relevant as the 
sovereign can change and suspend the rules of the legal order so that the apparent contradiction 
is solved as the sovereign will thus be within the newly created legal order and outside of the 
previous legal order. The seeming contradiction is not truly an issue however, as it is the new 
legal order to which the sovereign is bound because the state of exception has suspended the old, 
precisely because of the ability for the sovereign to declare a state in which it is necessary to be 
outside the former legal order. As soon as a state of exception is declared the sovereign is within 
a new working rule of law. This creates a state of sovereignty that legal positivists will balk at, 
but it provides the best working definition to analyze tribunals as international criminal law has 
also strayed from legal positivism when trying crimes ex-post facto as well as establishing the 
jurisdiction to do so.  
IMT 
The International Military Tribunal was established to prosecute a number of crimes 
committed in the course of World War II. While genocide was not yet the name for such 
international crimes, the atrocities witnessed during the Holocaust at the hands of German guards 
and officials were prosecuted as crimes against humanity. The tribunal was established by the 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
16 Rasch, William. "From Sovereign Ban to Banning Sovereignty." 93-94. 
 
17 Schwab, George, and Carl Schmitt. "Introduction." Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of 
Sovereignty. Chicago and London: Chicago UP, 2005. Xliii-xliv. Print. 
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United States, Great Britain, France, and the Soviet Union.18 Notably, these countries had fought 
against Germany in WW II, which has led some people to cite the trials as “victor’s justice”. 
Nevertheless, the point of this inquiry will be to evaluate how the tribunal was established and 
how we can interpret the legal justification and reasoning keeping Schmitt’s sovereignty in mind.  
Robert Fine identifies the main arguments made by defendants at Nuremberg, one of 
which was that the charges brought up for crimes against humanity were not valid, as they were 
not clearly outlined as law.19 He also points out that the fact that crimes that could be tried as 
crimes against humanity “had to be committed against civilian populations, have some 
connection with war, and be carried out as part of a systematic governmental policy”20 acted as a 
“limiting factor”.21 The Charter of the IMT outlines the jurisdiction for crimes against humanity 
in Article 6, where the crime is also defined: “namely, murder, extermination, enslavement, 
deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, before or during 
the war; or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds in execution of or in connection 
with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic 
law of the country where perpetrated.”22 
This is the crime that is the most equivalent to compare to the crime of genocide that will 
be prosecuted decades later in the ICTY and ICTR. Article 6 both outlined crimes against 
                                                
18 "Nuremberg Trial Proceedings Vol. 1: Charter of the International Military Tribunal." The Avalon Project. Yale 
Law School, Web. <http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/imtconst.asp>.  
(Henceforth "Nuremberg Trial Proceedings Vol. 1: Charter of the International Military Tribunal." The Avalon 
Project.) 
 
19 Fine, Robert. "Crimes Against Humanity: Hannah Arendt and the Nuremberg Debates." European Journal of 
Social Theory 3.3 (2000): 300. SAGE Journals. Web. (Henceforth Fine, Robert. “Crimes Against Humanity...”) 
 
20 Fine, Robert. “Crimes Against Humanity...” 294. 
 
21 Fine, Robert. “Crimes Against Humanity...” 294. 
  
22 "Nuremberg Trial Proceedings Vol. 1: Charter of the International Military Tribunal." The Avalon Project. 
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humanity, and established jurisdiction for the crime. The reference as to what allowed for this 
jurisdiction was the agreement referred to in the Charter in Article one (the London Agreement), 
between the Allied powers.23 The London Agreement, and therefore the jurisdiction receives its 
power from the four countries who established this Charter. All of these were clearly in a 
position to hold authority over the Allied Axis countries, who had just lost the war. The article to 
establish jurisdiction then, gets its authority by referencing the same document, which has clear 
implications for the regard for the sovereign state at the time the Charter was being written. The 
Westphalian model of sovereignty failed after WW II, as a system of nation-states that were, at 
face value, taken to be equivalent, was dependant upon political backing by the nation state. 
After the war Germany did not have the political power that the Allied countries did, which 
allowed them to establish the trials. 
 Philosopher Karl Jaspers claimed that the trials at Nuremberg (which included the IMT) 
“undercut”24 national sovereignty because it allowed for state officials and head of governments 
to be prosecuted, this was allowed for in Article 7 of the Charter. While this may have been a 
step towards eradicating impunity for gross violence on the part of government officials, it also 
meant that Germany had its sovereignty “undercut”, but that the Allied countries, who also 
committed war crimes, were able to maintain their sovereignty after the war.  
This sovereignty was further impeded upon in Article 8, which maintained that the claim 
that a defendant was following orders did “not free him from responsibility”25 of crimes outlined 
                                                
23 "Nuremberg Trial Proceedings Vol. 1: Charter of the International Military Tribunal." The Avalon Project. 
 
24 Fine, Robert. “Crimes Against Humanity..” 294. 
Fine draws this analysis from Jasper’s book, The Question of German Guilt:  
Jaspers, Karl. The Question of German Guilt. New York: Capricorn, 1961. Print. 
 
25  "Nuremberg Trial Proceedings Vol. 1: Charter of the International Military Tribunal." The Avalon Project. 
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in the Charter. This yet again displayed that Germany’s political power and claim to equal 
sovereignty was null in the tribunal. The Allied countries declared the commands of the German 
government to no longer have weight, essentially making Germany a lesser sovereign or 
arguably implying that it no longer had sovereignty at all. 
The Nuremberg Military Trials, run strictly by the US after the IMT,26 also prosecuted 
Germans for crimes committed during the war. In a memorandum to Telford Taylor, the chief 
prosecutor for the Nuremberg Trials, Robert Kempner sent the notes of Mr. Fried on April 3, 
1947. Notably, Fried began by stating that “The entire recent development of International Law 
is in the direction of limiting the concept of sovereignty”27. He continues to note that Germany, 
however, is not a sovereign state, “as a result of the unconditional surrender and the complete 
collapse and disintegration of the German State machinery”.28 So he first states that sovereignty 
is becoming limited in international law, and then proceeds to nullify the need for this claim by 
noting that Germany is not a sovereign state anyway.  
                                                
26 "International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg." United States Holocaust Memorial Museum. United States 
Holocaust Memorial Council, 29 Jan. 2016. Web. 
<https://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article.php?ModuleId=10007069>. 
 
27 Fried’s Notes: 
Fried, John. "Question: Does This Tribunal Possess Jurisdiction to Try, and If Found Guilty to Convict German 
Citizens or Citizens of Any Other Country, for Crimes against German Citizens?"1.  
These notes come from a letter from Robert Kempner to Taylor:  
Kempner, Robert M.W. "Jurisdiction in Cases of "Germans against Germans"" Letter to Telford Taylor. 3 Apr. 
1947.  
(These documents can be found in archived documents in the Rare Book and Manuscript Library at Columbia 
University, found in the files of Telford Taylor, this specific document can be in box 26 of the Telford Taylor 
papers, in the folder labeled “NMT-Correspondence and Reports-Crimes Against Humanity (1947)”, which is in 
series 5, subseries 1, box number 1, folder 2) 
(Henceforth Fried, John. "Question: Does This Tribunal Possess Jurisdiction…”) 
 
28 Fried, John. "Question: Does This Tribunal Possess Jurisdiction…”1. 
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Freid claims that “the occupying powers exercise sovereignty in Germany”.29   While this 
comment was made in the context of defending the jurisdiction of the Nuremberg Military Trials 
to prosecute German citizens for crimes against other German citizens, it certainly is applicable 
to the IMT as well. What this supports is that the formation of the IMT also represented a 
limitation or complete nullification of Germany’s sovereignty, because the Allies controlled the 
proceedings.  
 As already pointed out, the establishment of crimes against humanity was met with 
contention, but the IMT also included war crimes and crimes against peace.30 The Charter 
explicated in Article 6 that crimes against peace included  “waging of a war of aggression, or a 
war in violation of international treaties”.31 In the course of the Nuremberg Military Tribunals 
the concept of aggressive warfare that was established by the Charter of the IMT was challenged.  
In a letter from Frederick J. Libby to Senator Clyde R. Hoey, Libby cited Taylor’s Information 
Bulletin, from the magazine of US Military Government in Germany, the Bulletin noted that “the 
concept of the crime of aggressive warfare” was “challenged as legally invalid under the 
principle nullum crimen nulla poena sin lege. (No crime and no penalty without law.)” 32   
                                                
29 Fried, John. "Question: Does This Tribunal Possess Jurisdiction…”1. 
 
30 "Nuremberg Trial Proceedings Vol. 1: Charter of the International Military Tribunal." The Avalon Project. 
 
31 "Nuremberg Trial Proceedings Vol. 1: Charter of the International Military Tribunal." The Avalon Project. 
 
32 Libby, Fredrick J. "Smoke of Controversy Marks Judicial Fire." Letter to Clyde R. Hoey. 5 July 1949. MS. 
Washington, D.C. 1.  
The quote referenced in the letter came from the source below:  
 Taylor, Telford,. "Information Bulletin, Magazine of US Military Government in Germany." May 31, 1949.  
 (The letter containing this quote can be found in archived documents in the Rare Book and Manuscript Library at 
Columbia University, found in the files of Telford Taylor, this specific document can be in box 26 of the Telford 
Taylor papers, in the folder labeled “NMT-Correspondence (1947-1949)”, which is in series 5, subseries 1, box 
number 1, folder 1)  
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The Judgement of the Law of the Charter, however, did confront this. Noting that, “the 
maxim nullum crimen sine lege is not a limitation of sovereignty, but is in general a principle of 
justice”.33 The Judgement identifies the relevant international treaties that established general 
principles of warfare. Before exploring these however, it seems important to un-pack the 
statement that what was occurring was not a “limitation” of sovereignty but a “general principle 
of justice”. This claim, seems largely to be a way to establish a new perception of sovereignty, 
and set a precedence for future tribunals. I make this claim because upholding principles of 
justice is something that is inherently related to sovereign power. Hobbes’ common-wealth raises 
man out of the state of nature, by ensuring that certain rules of society are kept amongst the 
individuals in society,34 in the state of nature man is constantly in conflict35. The establishment 
of rules, law, and society then are inherently tied to sovereignty. Of course, my claim here could 
be argued. As Hobbes’ wrote hundreds of years ago, and perhaps his beliefs about the “state of 
nature” could be considered irrelevant to the current structure of societies and nation-states, 
especially in light of the large numbers of stateless persons that do not engage in conflict with 
one another. However, even so, the enforcement of “justice” is usually maintained by the 
government and/or police force of a sovereign state, and what makes these enforcements and 
rules hold any meaningful power is that they are established and enforced by the backing of the 
state. To differentiate between sovereignty and enforcing justice is creating a false dichotomy for 
all intents and purposes. What is considered just, and what rules need to be enforced, what 
justice needs to be upheld, is usually decided by the sovereign. In light of this it appears the only 
                                                
33 "Judgment : The Law of the Charter." The Avalon Project. Yale Law School, Web. 
<http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/judlawch.asp>.  
(Henceforth "Judgment : The Law of the Charter." The Avalon Project.) 
 
34 Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan. 264. 
 
35 Rasch, William. "From Sovereign Ban to Banning Sovereignty." 101. 
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way to rescue the claim that it was not a “limitation” on sovereignty is to view the occupying 
powers who established the IMT to be the sovereign power at the time of establishment.  
In concession, “general principle of justice” is likely more a claim to a universal 
sentiment of justice and morality than the enforcement of justice as legal systems domestically. 
The Judgement explicates, “To assert that it is unjust to punish those who in defiance of treaties 
and assurances have attacked neighbouring states without warning is obviously untrue, for in 
such circumstances the attacker must know that he is doing wrong, and so far from it being 
unjust to punish him, it would be unjust if his wrong were allowed to go unpunished.”36 
At the time of WW II countries and territories were more inter-connected, so this general 
principle could be a reference to sentiment amongst most countries at the time. If so, then the 
statement can only mean that there was a limitation of sovereignty occurring, one in which acts 
of a nation-state did not align with general sentiment and thus other nations used political power, 
in line with this general sentiment, to directly hold accountable the outlier.  
In order to assert that justice was being enforced the Judgement references the several 
treaties that it relies upon to establish international law, and respond to the argument that the 
crimes being prosecuted were legally invalid. The Judgment notes that Germany violated the 
Kellogg-Briand Pact by waging war, and that this violation was essentially an international 
crime. However, “the Pact does not expressly enact that such wars are crimes, or set up courts to 
try those who make such wars.”37 The Tribunal then proceeded to say that since violations of the 
Hague Convention of 1907 have been tried by military tribunals, “those who wage aggressive 
war are doing that which is equally illegal”38 and can thus be tried in tribunals. The Judgement 
                                                
36 "Judgment : The Law of the Charter." The Avalon Project. 
37 "Judgment : The Law of the Charter." The Avalon Project. 
 
38  "Judgment : The Law of the Charter." The Avalon Project. 
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again references principles of justice: “The law of war is to be found not only in treaties, but in 
the customs and practices of states which gradually obtained universal recognition, and from the 
general principles of justice applied by jurists and practiced by military courts.”39 
The Judgement points out that a draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance as well as the 1924 
Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes made it clear that leading countries 
agreed that aggressive war was considered an international crime. “Although the Protocol was 
never ratified, it was signed by leading statesmen of the world”.40 At the time however, while 
Italy and Japan were members of the League, Germany was not.41 In 1927 all members, which 
included Germany by this point, adopted a declaration that stated “a war of aggression can never 
serve as a means of settling international disputes, and is in consequence an international 
crime…”.42  In addition, the Judgement identified that “(t)he unanimous resolution of the 18th 
February, 1928, of twenty-one American Republics of the Sixth (Havana) Pan-American 
Conference” posited war of aggression as an international crime.43  
While these declarations, treaties, and agreements may all be essential to making the 
claim that an international crime had been committed, the structure for legal recourse remained 
unanswered. To this the Judgement answered with the Treaty of Versailles as evidence that the 
Tribunal was a valid way to prosecute both the crimes that it had clearly outlined and 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
39  "Judgment : The Law of the Charter." The Avalon Project. 
 
40 "Judgment : The Law of the Charter." The Avalon Project. 
 
41 "Judgment : The Law of the Charter." The Avalon Project. 
 
42 "Judgment : The Law of the Charter." The Avalon Project. 
The quote itself comes from a declaration at a meeting of the Assembly of the League of Nations on September 
24th, 1927, a direct citation to the record of the meeting was not available at the above source.  
 
43 "Judgment : The Law of the Charter." The Avalon Project. 
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international crimes. The Treaty of Versailles in 1919, clearly stated that Germany submitted to 
Allied powers the right to “bring before military tribunals persons accused of having committed 
acts in violation of the laws and customs of war.”44 
The Judgment then proceeded to establish that “individuals can be punished for violations 
of international law”45, and that international law was relevant to individuals and not just 
sovereign states.46 Without delving too much into this statement, it seems this claim is quite 
obvious not only because of past cases, but also because sovereign states function and derive 
power from individuals. It is a constant paradox of sovereign power that the sovereign receives 
power from individuals yet individuals are restrained by those who are considered sovereign. 
Thus if a sovereign state can be considered to have broken a law then certainly so can 
individuals. The Tribunal however felt it necessary to establish that following orders was not an 
excuse for international violations, while it could be a factor taken into consideration (this is 
spelled out in Article 8 of the Charter). The Tribunal explicated that “the very essence of the 
Charter is that individuals have international duties which transcend the national obligations of 
obedience imposed by the individual State.”47  
To this point I would have to contend that the Charter was here setting an important 
precedent in claiming that individuals had obligations to their countries, as well as the 
international community. There is not much of an argument other than answering to commands 
that holds up to the claim that individuals can be tried for international crimes. Military tribunals 
                                                
44 "The Versailles Treaty June 28, 1919: Part VII." The Avalon Project. Yale Law School, n.d. Web. 
<http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/partvii.asp#art228>. 
 
45 "Judgment : The Law of the Charter." The Avalon Project. 
 
46  "Judgment : The Law of the Charter." The Avalon Project. 
 
47 "Judgment : The Law of the Charter." The Avalon Project.  
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are, and were, not new. However, military tribunals were done not internationally but held 
domestically.48 That wars of aggression were international crimes was clearly established by the 
Judgement of the Charter: but could the Treaty of Versailles extend to all future wars to assume 
that Germany would always concede to being tried by the Allied powers? Especially in view of 
the fact that Germany withdrew from the League of Nations, the Covenant of which served as 
Part I of the Treaty of Versailles49 in 1933.50 In addition, after WW I, the tribunals agreed to in 
the Treaty were held domestically.51 The Judgement notes that  “the law of war is to be found not 
only in treaties, but in the customs and practices of states which gradually obtained universal 
recognition,”.52 This may be true yet up to this point in history there was nothing “customary” in 
the holdings of military tribunals that were not held domestically.  
 In a telegram/memorandum to General Taylor in 1947 from the WDSCA, on April 15th 
1947 references James G McDonald, the High Commissioner for Refugees from Germany :  
“Apart from the Upper Silesia Convention of May 1922, Germany does not 
appear to be expressly bound by a treaty obligation providing for equal citizenship 
of racial, religious, or linguistic minorities. But the principle of respect for the 
rights of minorities has been during the last three centuries hardening into an 
obligation of the public law of Europe. That principle as recognized in some of 
the most important international instruments of the nineteenth century. I may refer 
to the provisions of the Congress of Vienna, the Treaty of Guarantee following 
upon the union of Belgium and Holland, the collective recognition of the 
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independence of Greece, the creation of the autonomous principalities of 
Moldavia and Wallachia.”53 
 
This correspondence occurred in the context of the Nuremberg Military Trials, yet it 
seems important to consider the discussed “principle” in light of the establishment and 
codification of crimes against humanity in the Charter of the IMT.  The argument that the actions 
outlined in the Charter as crimes against humanity were within the jurisdiction of the IMT is 
probably best represented by a basic appeal to customary law. Here I find it necessary to again 
note that Germany withdrew from the League of Nations. Although of course none of the 
mentioned treaties clearly outlined crimes against humanity, they do support McDonald’s claim 
that a respectable treatment towards minorities was becoming customary, yet the actual 
codification of crimes against humanity and subsequent prosecution still represent something 
new in international law and as such can definitely be seen to re-cast sovereignty within the 
human rights regime, serving as a statement about accountability.  
Of course, fear that justice would not truly be carried out if military tribunals were held 
domestically was a legitimate one, as after WW I the trials in Germany were of “limited 
scope”.54 To prevent this from occurring once again, especially in light of the numbers of lives 
lost because of policies implemented by the Nazi party, the International Military Tribunal may 
better have served justice. Past history suggests that a domestic tribunal would not have been as 
far-reaching as the IMT. However, it important to remember that the Allied powers also 
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committed war crimes in the course of WW II, yet it was the Axis powers who would be tried 
under the IMT. This perhaps hits at the biggest tension in the sovereignty debate. While the 
Judgement of the Charter claims that the Charter did not limit sovereignty, the “general principle 
of justice”55 seemed to be only applicable to Axis powers, while individuals who committed war 
crimes on the Allied side would not be tried in international tribunals, if at all. Those with the 
most political power retained their sovereignty while others did not.  
So what can be taken away from the sovereignty debate over the IMT? The IMT tried 
crimes that were not clearly outlined in international law, but were supposedly established by 
custom, paving the way to a new precedent for international law.  It is clear that by this point the 
German government, after surrendering, was under control of the occupying powers. Here it is 
necessary to consider what territorial control implies for sovereignty. Notably, Andreas Osiander 
wrote that “the prevalence of the Westphalian myth in IR is the result of nineteenth- and 
twentieth-century historians adopting a certain standard account of 1648”.56 It seems that if the 
concept of a Westphalian sovereignty was created by 19th and 20th century historians then it was 
also still disregarded in politics amongst the international community. Fried’s point that with the 
defeat of Germany the occupying powers represented the sovereign in the nation-state territory is 
in line with Schmitt’s view. A sovereign power has the ability to decide what constitutes the state 
of exception, and the occupying powers did just that. In choosing which crimes (and in fact 
writing the first official texts of some crimes) they both created law and then chose when and to 
whom it would be applied, notably that Allied individuals were not under this umbrella. As a law 
making body, and also in deciding when these laws could be put on “hold” so to speak for a state 
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of exception, the actions of the Occupying powers certainly fall within what is allowed for by the 
sovereign.  
If we accept the argument that Germany was no longer a sovereign state (Fried makes 
this claim in the context of the NMT57), then the formation of the IMT represents a transition of 
sovereignty to the occupying powers, not to the nation-state and the current recognition of 
territory that was the German government. Thus, the trial did limit sovereignty yet was in line 
with the Westphalian conception that territorial control was necessary for establishing a 
sovereign power. If so, the power came not from the people of Germany granting the Allies 
sovereign power, but more so from the international community as well as the political power 
gained from the triumph of the Allies. Yet, the Tribunal did represent a shift in the conception of 
sovereignty by establishing the jurisdiction to prosecute heads of state, as previously the “hands-
off” policy of Westphalian or traditional sovereignty meant that rulers and governments were 
free to act within their nation-state without being held accountable. The concept of Westphalian 
sovereignty was only partially maintained in the creation of the Charter, because while the 
territory was now under the control of a different government, the prior government could now 
be held responsible for actions in their own nation-state of which they, at one point, had 
sovereign power in. The aspect of territorial control as an element of sovereignty remained intact 
in the regime, with the transfer of control to the Allied Powers, but sovereign immunity, and 
non-interference did not. In establishing the Tribunal and the right to prosecute all levels of state 
officials the Allies were declaring a state of exception to the norm. Schmitt’s definition is more 
fitting for this situation and allows us to see the impact that the human rights regime, in the 
creation of tribunals to hold individuals accountable, had on the way sovereignty is treated in the 
international community.  
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What this means for the human rights regime may not be clear, as the United Nations was 
just getting under way, but it seems that if the IMT represented justice and accountability for 
gross violations of human rights, to do so meant that the German government could no longer be 
the sovereign power in its own country. It’s certain that if sovereignty was no longer being 
regarded in international law as a valid concept for remaining above accountability, the cases in 
which sovereignty were made invalid were chosen selectively. The argument may of course be 
made that this is because the Holocaust in Germany far exceeded the brutality of war, yet 
remember that this was the first international military tribunal, and there was not one after the 
Armenian genocide. Does the concept of a “contingent sovereignty” really hold for international 
tribunals or is sovereignty disregarded after a “weak” state commits violations but not when a 
“strong” one, such as the states of the Allies, commit violations?  In order to assess if this is truly 
how the regime ensures accountability it is necessary to look at responses by the international 
community and the UN in other similar situations. In order to do so academic and human rights 
activists would have to wait almost fifty years. 
ICTY 
The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia was established by the 
Security Council of the United Nations in 1993.58 The tribunal, similar to the IMT prosecuted 
individuals for crimes against humanity, and, in addition the crime of genocide was prosecuted59 
(a term that since WW II had been codified into international law). The Tribunal made a firm 
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statement about accountability in charging state officials60 and even in the choice to create a  
tribunal through the Security Council. The creation of the ICTY was different than the IMT in 
several important ways: it was established by the UN, but those countries who created the IMT 
had been involved in the war leading up to Allied control, whereas the countries on the Security 
Council were not all directly affected by conflict in Yugoslavia. This may quell any thoughts of 
the ICTY being considered “victor’s justice” but the question to consider then is whether or not 
state sovereignty was respected differently in the ICTY than the IMT. 
Resolution 827 declared that the conflict in the territory that was at one point Yugoslavia 
represented an international threat.61 The Resolution also declared that the establishment of the 
tribunal was a power granted to the Security Council in the Charter of the United Nations, 
namely chapter seven.62 Chapter VII does not expressly outline the capability to establish a 
tribunal,63 but it does allow, in Article 39, that the Security Council “shall decide what measures 
shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace 
and security”.64 It is important to note that Article 40 says that the Security Council “may ….call 
upon the parties concerned to comply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary or 
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desirable”.65 The Charter then does give the Security Council quite a wide range of actions to 
pursue, and while it explicitly lists certain actions, it does not outline the process of establishing 
a tribunal. This certainly puts those on the Council in a position of power, and with the power of 
the Permanent Five to veto the question becomes: can any of these countries ever be similarly 
checked by the international community? 
There are two issues to consider in light of the Security Council Resolution. The first 
being that Yugoslavia was not existent at the time of the proceedings, and the second being 
whether or not the Security Council was acting in accord with the desires of the nation-states in 
establishing the Tribunal, and whether or not the council had consulted with these nation-states 
about prosecuting the crimes domestically.  
The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia fell apart in 1991, as Croatia, one of the six 
republics of which made up Yugoslavia declared independence.66 Yugoslavia signed and ratified 
the UN Charter in 1945,67 however the countries that declared independence would not become 
members of the UN until 1992 and on (Montenegro did not become a member of the UN until 
2006).68 Notably, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Slovenia, and the former Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia all became members of the UN prior to the establishment of the tribunal. In the 
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record of the Resolution 827 that established the ICTY, representatives from Bosnia and 
Herzegovina as well as Croatia were present at the Security Council meeting, and were allowed 
to participate in discussion, but were not granted a vote.69 It is important to bear in mind that the 
genocide that occurred at Srebrenica was in the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but this had 
not occurred at the time the tribunal was established. Croatia was also involved in the conflict in 
Bosnia, as Bosnian Croats declared independence with support from Croatia.70 The genocide at 
Srebrenica, which was a UN safe area happened in 1995, and was “lead by the Bosnian Serb 
commander Ratko Mladić”.71 Due to the fact that this is directly related to the crime of genocide, 
of particular interest to the inquiry at hand, and because the acts relevant happened after the 
establishment of the tribunal, there is no room for a claim that the tribunal and the crimes in its 
jurisdiction had not yet been established and were thus ex-post facto. 
At the Security Council meeting in May 1993 comments relating to the establishment of 
the tribunal had to do with acts committed in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which was a member of 
the UN at the time, although the whole territory of the former Yugoslavia was considered to fall 
under the tribunal.72 This is markedly different from the IMT as it is clearly obvious that the 
German government was not a part of the agreement by the Allied powers to establish the IMT. 
In this way, the sovereignty of Bosnia and Herzegovina was at least in play, so to speak, as a 
member, but they were not granted a vote at the Security Council meeting. Notably, multiple 
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representatives referred to Bosnia and Herzegovina's sovereignty during the meeting.73 China, 
while voting in favor of the resolution called for a treaty to establish the tribunal and expressed 
“reservations”, stating that giving “the Tribunal both preferential and exclusive jurisdiction is not 
in compliance with the principle of State judicial sovereignty”.74 Brazil noted a desire for the 
General Assembly to vote on the establishment of the tribunal,75 so as to include more members 
in the voting and consideration of the Tribunal. This note is also important to evaluate as the 
Security Council President at the time claimed that “the entire international community that, 
through the Tribunal, will be passing sentence”76 responding to the events in the Former 
Yugoslavia, and it raises the important question: who is the international community? The 
Security Council, with only five permanent members can surely not be considered the 
international community. Of course, these broad claims may be based on general sentiment, but 
then how is it decided who does the speaking for this community? I advocate that it is those with 
the most political power, not those that are necessarily representative of general sentiment 
amongst members of the UN. Brazil also noted disagreement that the Tribunal should be 
established by Security Council only, and instead suggested a Convention, but ultimately did 
vote favorably for Resolution 827 which established the Statute of the Tribunal.77  
While some countries did note apprehension about the way that the Tribunal was 
established, the Tribunal was not setting precedent the way the IMT was. In the same meeting 
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Venezuela notes that the Tribunal does not have “the ability to set down norms of international 
law or to legislate with respect to those rights. It simply applies existing international 
humanitarian law.”78 The crimes that fell under the jurisdiction of the tribunal were pre-existing 
in the codification of international law. Japan also had reservations about the legal validity of the 
tribunal:“Perhaps more extensive legal studies could have been undertaken on various aspects of 
the Statute, such as the question of the principle of nullum crimen sine lege and on measures to 
establish a bridge with domestic legal systems”.79 
The principle of “no punishment without a crime” was a concern as well during the IMT. 
The crimes covered by the Tribunal are international laws, and may not be written into domestic 
law or have clear prosecution guidelines codified, but all of the crimes covered do represent 
violations that should be covered by the UN Charter. Even if the laws have not been codified and 
implemented into domestic laws in nation-state territories at least some of the countries involved 
in the Tribunal had already become members of the UN by this point. In addition, all of the 
nation-states that represented the former Republic of Yugoslavia had become members of the 
UN before the Tribunal had ceased hearing trials. So while the resolutions that established the 
Tribunal were not a part of the Charter that the nation states agreed to uphold upon becoming 
members, certainly the principles in it were. While the Security Council created the Tribunal 
under Chapter VII, it does not mention tribunals explicitly. So creating an international tribunal 
to hold individuals accountable outside of the domestic remedies certainly represents a symbolic 
interjection into state sovereignty, if nothing else because it removes the need for domestic 
jurisdiction and justice systems, and creates a kind of international accountability that the nation-
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state in question may not subscribe to, yet is one that directly affects its citizens. Notably, after a 
time of conflict and civil war the legal remedies and justice system may not have had the 
appropriate resources to hear cases. The representatives of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina 
did not make comments at the meeting to propose the statute of the Tribunal itself. Yet nor were 
they given a vote. The issue raised by Japan is relevant to consider in light of this as well. The 
fact that these nation-states did not get a vote, yet the nation-states on the Security Council did, 
certainly aligns with the critique by Japan that the establishment of the Tribunal was done so in a 
way that was not fully aligned with or recognized each nation-state as a sovereign power.  
 The Tribunal, international in nature, presents some tension with state sovereignty not 
merely because the countries involved were not granted a vote, but also because of the limitation 
that it places on domestic and national courts. Albright, the United States representative, noted 
that “every Government, including each one in the former Yugoslavia, will be obligated to hand 
over those indicted by the Tribunal.”80 Placing an obligation on other nation-states, including 
those outside of the Security Council begs the question of whose sovereignty is nullified, if 
anyone’s by one group of countries demanding action from others. The President, while 
explaining that the Tribunal was not meant to “abolish nor replace national justice organs”81, also 
states that domestic courts were to “give very serious consideration to a request 
by the Tribunal to refer to it a case that is being considered in a national court”.82 Multiple 
representatives noted that the international tribunal, according to articles 9 and 10 had primacy 
over domestic courts in the given territory, the former Yugoslavia. The representative of the UK 
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noted that the primacy of the international tribunal is not relevant in other nation-states unless 
“exceptional circumstances outlined in Article 10, paragraph 2” are relevant.83  Turning directly 
to Articles 9 and 10 of the Statute, Article 9 establishes primacy but Article 10 goes somewhat 
further by declaring that, if a person had already been tried in a domestic court, the International 
Tribunal may try the same individual “only if: (a) the act for which he or she was tried was 
characterized as an ordinary crime; or (b) the national court proceedings were not impartial or 
independent, were designed to shield the accused from international criminal responsibility, or 
the case was not diligently prosecuted.”84  
The comments make it clear that the international tribunal held weight that national 
courts didn’t, and Article 10 presents another conundrum. If an individual was tried by the ICTY 
after being tried domestically then it is a direct judgement on the national courts who originally 
prosecuted the case. It is a direct limitation on sovereignty and the choice of what is and isn’t a 
legitimate trial is left to other nation-states. The representative from Morocco claimed that the 
Tribunal was a part of the process that was required to “restore the territorial integrity, unity and 
sovereignty of Bosnia and Herzegovina.”85 This suggests that at least one country present who 
voted for the Tribunal felt that Bosnia and Herzegovina were not fully sovereign states. Does the 
establishment of an international tribunal help aid in this, or are those on the Security Council 
seen as white knights to aid in restoring sovereignty? The articles place limits on national 
sovereignty, so can it be that the tribunal was helping to restore it after conflict? The articles also 
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imply that the conception of all sovereign states being equal is not valid in the human rights 
regime, as certain states were given the power to decide whether or not domestic courts were 
valid or legitimate in trials related to crimes covered by the Statute. This removes the need for 
domestic courts to be directly involved in the prosecution, and in allowing and even encouraging 
domestic courts to give the international tribunal primacy over domestic courts, the domestic 
courts and national processes do not help establish and maintain accountability for human rights 
violations during the conflict. While this might be the most prudent and even the best decision in 
many cases it also puts a limitation on the judicial process at the national level.  
In evaluating the statute itself, Article 13 outlines the judges who are to serve on the 
Tribunal. Permanent judges are to be elected by the General Assembly, but the list from which 
they are to be elected is one that is compiled by the Security Council.86 Ad litem judges are 
selected in the same way. The nominations for judges can be submitted from member states of 
the UN as well as those that are not members but have permanent missions with the UN. During 
any term at the request of whoever is the president of the tribunal the Secretary-General can 
appoint an ad litem judge “for one or more trials, for a cumulative period of up to, but not 
including, three years”.87 None of the permanent judges selected have been from nation-states in 
the former Republic of Yugoslavia.88 While the General Assembly makes the final decision 
about judges, the Security Council creates the initial pool to select from. The Security Council 
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then creates the tribunal and then establishes who can sit as judge, giving the Security Council 
members more control in steering the direction of the Tribunal.  
Article 27 of the statute is as follows: 
“Imprisonment shall be served in a State designated by the International Tribunal from a 
list of States which have indicated to the Security Council their willingness to accept convicted 
persons. Such imprisonment shall be in accordance with the applicable law of the State 
concerned, subject to the supervision of the International Tribunal.”89 
  
Article 29 deals specifically with cooperation of nation-states.  
“1. States shall co-operate with the International Tribunal in the investigation and 
prosecution of persons accused of committing serious violations of international humanitarian 
law.  
2. States shall comply without undue delay with any request for assistance or an order 
issued by a Trial Chamber, including, but not limited to:  
(a) the identification and location of persons;  
(b) the taking of testimony and the production of evidence;  
(c) the service of documents;  
(d) the arrest or detention of persons;  
(e) the surrender or the transfer of the accused to the International Tribunal.”90 
 
What these two articles taken together show is the superiority of the capabilities of the 
Security Council over other nation-states. Article 29 demands cooperation from other nation-
states,91 essentially nullifying and deeming any domestic efforts for accountability of those 
nation-states who are then asked to turn over individuals to the tribunal. Anne Bodley, in a note 
she wrote while at NYU Law School, says that the demand in Article 29 “goes beyond the 
Member States of the United Nations. More specifically, in this instance it reaches the States of 
the former Yugoslavia as yet without membership in the United Nations and whose support 
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could not be counted on under the Charter.”92 In addition, as outlined in Article 27 the fact that 
imprisonment in nation-states was subject to the approval and recommendation of the Security 
Council93 also means that state sovereignty of these nation-states is, at least to some extent, 
controlled by the Security Council. Bodley makes the claim that the ICTY “meant that the 
institution of state sovereignty was weakened a little for most of the world’s states- but it was 
probably strengthened for five.”94 Bodley bases this argument, in part, on the power and “reach” 
of the Security Council and the ICTY to mandate nation-states to act in accordance with 
demands or requests from the Tribunal.95 However, for those nation-states who were obliged to 
cooperate with the ICTY, it is not so simple as some states having sovereignty weakened. Instead 
the state sovereignty of some nation-states was completely overlooked, not merely weakened, 
essentially becoming an extension of the sovereignty of the Security Council. Certainly, the 
Security Council did not move into other nation-states, as if colonizing the territory, but had 
authority over the domestic judicial systems of these nation-states as if they were colonial 
powers, at least in relation to crimes covered by the Tribunal.  
Karadzic, a “political chief”96 mentioned in the comments by the Security Council at the 
establishment of the Statute, was prosecuted in the Tribunal. I refer to his case, because of his 
mention in these comments, and also because the Trial Chambers issued a statement rebuking the 
Former Republic of Yugoslavia and Republika Srpska for not arresting both Karadzic and 
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Mladic.97 The issued press release stated that in line with the Dayton Peace Accords, this failure 
represented “a breach of the obligations made on its behalf by the FRY during the Dayton Peace 
Agreement.”98 In response to this failure, the press release also issued a statement that, “The 
international warrants will be sent to all States and, if necessary, to the Implementation Force 
(IFOR). All States will henceforth be legally obliged to arrest the accused if they come within 
their jurisdiction.”99  
This press release presents a conundrum when considering state sovereignty. By issuing a 
statement that nation-states were legally obligated to arrest “accused” there is an impetus put on 
all nation-states, while the Dayton Peace Accords were not signed by all nation-states. In 
addition, the use of the term “legally obliged” presents another consideration. If nation-states 
have domestic legal systems, domestic, then where is the source of legal obligation coming 
from? Binding agreements may be made, treaties represent hard law, but the problem arises of 
which legal force, domestic or hard law in the form of treaties has superiority. Hypothetically, 
the consideration would never be needed, as countries can be expected to abide by obligations 
outlined in treaties. Yet again, not all nation-states signed the Dayton Accords, so to legally 
“obligate” every nation-state to arrest indicted individuals implies a superiority over domestic 
legal systems. Certainly many countries agreed to cooperate with the requests of the ICTY, so 
where does obligation come from if these nation-states were not part of a treaty or other binding 
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law? The obligation comes from the demand of the Trial Chambers, a branch of the Tribunal 
established by the Security Council. The impetus then comes from the power and political force 
that allows the Security Council to establish a Tribunal that can make such statements and 
demands to the international community. The impetus to be in line with the Tribunal could be 
out of a desire to be in line with morality, and a sense of justice that nation-states want to upheld, 
but as was seen with the FRY and Republika Srpska that idea of morality may not be shared. 
Many countries probably abide with obligation just to be in line with the Security Council, in 
order to not violate emerging norms and also to not cut any political ties with important and 
politically powerful nation-states, such as the P5. Karadzic was eventually arrested in Serbia,100 
so eventually the international community came to align with the demands of the tribunal, which 
also underscores how big of a role the tribunal came to play as opposed to domestic courts.  
Bodley points out that in the course of the Blasikic case the “Tribunal also has the power 
to demand a sovereign state produce evidence (here, documents) for the purpose of proving 
charges against an indictee, although it may not compel a particular state official to comply with 
the order”.101 To demand a sovereign state to comply with the Tribunal means that the sovereign 
state is answering to a power that is in authority over them, essentially nullifying full sovereignty 
and giving whatever authority it is the power of exception. To say then that the Security Council 
could establish the exception is no stretch, especially in light of the fact that the political power 
of the P5 means that few countries will not comply. As an extension of this, as Bodley points 
out, “with permanent seats on the Security Council and the ever-present ability to veto any action 
the Security Council has under consideration, there are at least five states against 
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whom it is unlikely a tribunal would ever be convened”.102 
 The Secretary-General issued a report, which discussed the legal basis for the formation 
of the Tribunal. The report makes reference to concerns that the Security Council comments 
already referred to echoed, namely that the Tribunal was not treaty or conference based and that 
the General Assembly was not more involved. In response the report claims that putting together 
such a treaty would be more time consuming and that involving the General Assembly would 
also “not be reconcilable with the urgency expressed by the Security Council in resolution 808 
(1993)”.103 Another anecdotal, yet important, support offered for the establishment of the 
Tribunal by the Security Council was that “there could be no guarantee that ratifications will be 
received from those States which should be parties to the treaty if it is to be truly effective”.104 In 
addition, the report references the creation of “subsidiary organs”105 in the past by the Security 
Council, noting Resolution 687 (1991) pertaining to Kuwait and Iraq. It seems that this reference 
was intended to establish a sort of precedent as the report goes on to say, “In this particular case, 
the “Security Council would be establishing, as an enforcement measure under Chapter VII, a 
subsidiary organ within the terms of Article 29 of the Charter, but one of a judicial nature”.106 
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The report outlines the expectation that “This organ would, of course, have to perform its 
functions independently of political considerations”.107 
 In light of this report, it seems important to consider how the need for a speedy solution 
to the conflict in Yugoslavia meant that a treaty was bypassed, and the General Assembly was 
left out of the process of establishing the Tribunal. In doing so, the Security Council, finding the 
conflict demanded a quick response, created something akin to the state of exception. Granted, 
there was no move to be “outside” of a constitution and put those rights on hold, but the 
interpretation of the Charter, and the subsidiary organs that were allowed to be established 
through powers granted in the Charter was extended. In addition, the point that some nation-
states would not ratify a treaty, supporting the move to establish a Tribunal without one, is a 
direct disregard for full sovereign power of a nation-state. This seems to be in line with the idea 
of a “contingent sovereignty” amongst the human rights regime. Similar to the Responsibility to 
Protect, it seems that a group of powerful nation-states can intervene in another nation-state if 
actions inside are deemed to constitute gross human rights violations. Yet, as Bodley noted, there 
is little chance all states will be held accountable to the same extent. Meanwhile, those nation-
states on the Security Council, supported by the Secretary General, were able to establish a 
Tribunal without needing the assent of relevant nation-states. While the view that sovereignty is 
“contingent” upon a number of things may be strong within the human rights field, this may 
ultimately mean that politically strong nation-states retain sovereignty while others do not, as 
those that are on the P5 can establish when it is necessary to nullify the sovereignty of another 
nation-state in order to intervene.  
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This shifted the way sovereignty was being regarded in that the power came from an 
international body of nation-states, instead of necessarily from the citizens of a given nation-
state. In addition, the territorial control that was present for the Allies of WW II was not an 
aspect of the ICTY, as the establishing powers did not occupy the Former Yugoslavia in the 
same way as the Allies occupied Germany. Certainly the ability to collect evidence or extradite a 
witness represents some type of control, but not in the same complete sense as the Allies at the 




The ICTR was created after conflict broke out in Rwanda in which Hutu extremists were 
responsible for the killing of “Between eight-hundred thousand and one million men, women and 
children”.108  There had been long-term conflict in the area between Tutsis and Hutus, but it was 
in 1994 that genocidal killings occurred when “exiles of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (mainly 
Tutsis)” were returning to a“Hutu-dominated government”.109 The International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda was created in 1994, with the passing of Resolution 955. This resolution, 
like that which created the ICTY, was a Security Council Resolution. Notably the ICTY served 
as a type of precedence for the creation of the ICTR, which perhaps is why comments from the 
Security Council meeting are not included on the ICTR site. Author Helena Cobban refers to the 
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ICTR as a “sister-court”110 of the ICTY, as does the official ICTR site.111 In light of this the 
question to explore then is whether or not the ICTR and ICTY regarded sovereignty within the 
human rights regime the same way.  
 In the statute of the ICTR the Security Council “Urges States and intergovernmental and 
non-governmental organizations to contribute funds, equipment and services to the International 
Tribunal, including the offer of expert personnel”.112 While “urging” is certainly different than 
mandating or requiring action, the fact that the Security Council can offer this type of 
recommendation in a statute suggests it has a force in establishing international law and even 
expects organizations and states to comply with the requests of the Council. In a nation-state 
system in which all states are supposed to have equal sovereignty, to demand that states help 
create an independent tribunal certainly creates a contradiction in the nation-state system- if 
sovereign power is not the highest power, then it is not truly sovereign- the Council would be. Of 
course, this request falls short of a demand, but to encourage even NGO’s and IGO’s to comply 
with, and help support the tribunal suggests the Council is playing the role of a government, 
pressuring organizations within the relevant nation-state. In addition, the Security Council 
declared “that all States shall cooperate fully with the International Tribunal”.113 This statement 
is not just a call for action, but a mandate about what states must do, essentially nullifying the 
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concept of state sovereignty and replacing it with a “more sovereign” power that essentially 
receives its power from the political pull of the countries who vote on the Security Council. 
Author Peter R. Baehr notes that the tribunals are backed by political power, saying:  
“It was mainly for political reasons that the cases of the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda were 
singled out for judgement. There is certainly no legal reason why human rights in these countries 
should be dealt with and similar events in countries such as Burundi, Cambodia, Somalia, 
Liberia or Zaire/Congo (to name only a few of the more notorious ones) not.”114 
  Article 28 furthers the obligation of nation-states. It begins by re-stating that states shall 
“cooperate” with the Tribunal, but further defines the obligations by stating that states “shall 
comply without undue delay with any request for assistance or an order issued by a Trial 
Chamber”.115 The article then defines the actions that may be requested including locating 
persons of interest, “taking of testimony”, “service of documents”, “the arrest or detention of 
persons”, and “The surrender or the transfer of the accused to the International Tribunal for 
Rwanda”.116 What is striking about all of these obligations is that they mandate action and use of 
resources from nation-states, not just requesting non-interference in the Tribunal.  
 To request direct action implies that nation-states answer to the Security Council. Not 
only does this imply that countries are subservient to the Security Council, thereby creating an 
incongruous definition of nation-state power, but it also assumes that all countries can even 
provide the resources to meet these demands. Judges, in the manner of the ICTY, were chosen by 
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the General Assembly from a list that was compiled by the Security Council, after nominations 
are taken from United Nation member states “and non-member States maintaining permanent 
observer missions at United Nations Headquarters”117. While this may seem to act as a kind of 
check on the power of the Security Council, diffusing some of the responsibility to other 
members in the General Assembly, it still ensures that the Security Council gets a large part of 
deciding who gets their foot in the door, so to speak, by controlling which nominations will be 
on the final ballot that the General Assembly will see. Of course, this means that while the 
General Assembly can vote not to elect some nominations that perhaps the P5 wanted on the 
Tribunal, the P5 can ensure nominations they are adverse to do not even make it to the ballot, 
thereby giving them more control over the outcome by ensuring that all those that can be 
considered are not strongly opposed to.  
 In Article 8, the statute for the ICTR, like the ICTY, establishes the primacy of the 
Tribunal: “The International Tribunal for Rwanda shall have primacy over the national courts of 
all States.”118 In a nation-state system in which all nation-states have equal sovereignty, what 
does it mean for all nation-states to answer to an independent body? In theory, if all of the 
nation-states had equal part in the establishment of and commitment to the independent body, it 
would represent and reinforce the sovereign power of nation-states. However, the tension that 
arises with international tribunals, formed by the Security Council, stems from the fact that they  
are not created with input and agreement from all nation-states equally. Thus, it may be difficult 
to categorize the Tribunal as truly independent. Instead nation-states are expected to answer to a 
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tribunal established by other countries. Thus the theory that all nation-states are equal does not 
fit, and even the idea of a contingent sovereignty is not upheld, as the demands are put on nation-
states in which no conflict or extreme government mistreatment is occurring, and certainly not 
arresting a criminal does not amount to a gross violation severe enough to nullify a country’s 
sovereignty. Thus what is truly evolving within the human rights regime are imperialist demands 
that are handed down, not ironically, from those countries whose international reach most 
resembles empires today. 
The fact that the ICTR was modeled after the ICTY means that some type of precedence 
had already been set. However, there were ways in which the ICTR furthered the interpretation 
of international law. Before discussing these rulings however, it seems pertinent to evaluate 
whether or not the nation-state was receptive to the creation of the Tribunal. Schabas points out 
that Rwanda asked for help from the Security Council in creating an international court.119 If 
nation-states request help in establishing an international platform to try cases, then perhaps the 
Tribunal does not even need to be seen as an independent body established by outside countries, 
although the judges that sit on the Trial Chambers do not represent Rwandan citizens.120 The 
tension comes when certain nation-states place obligations and create new laws without the 
consent of relevant parties. While the ICTR was modeled after the ICTY, and can be seen as 
customary in it prosecution of genocide, which was codified in 1948: it did extend applicable 
law.  
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The ICTR is credited with being “the first international tribunal to hold members of the 
media responsible for broadcasts intended to inflame the public to commit acts of genocide”121, 
as well as extending the definition of the crime of genocide to include rape.122 The Genocide 
Convention includes “incitement to commit genocide” as a criminal act123, but while this was 
codified at the time of the ICTR, there was also a similar case in the International Military 
Tribunal which the judges cited in their judgment. Schabas explains that Julius Streicher was 
found guilty of crimes against humanity124 for “direct incitement”125 even though he was not a 
member of the military126.  Van der Merwe posits that the case of Streicher “represented de facto 
the first conviction for incitement to genocide at the international level”127 but that the ICTR 
further defined incitement and its applicability.128 
In addition, while the crime of genocide had yet to be written into law when the Charter 
of the IMT was established, the Trial Chamber of the ICTR, in the case of the Prosecutor v. 
Ferdinand Nahimana, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, and Hassan Ngeze (called the “Media Case”129) 
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notes that Julius Streicher “was convicted of crimes against humanity for his incitement to 
murder and extermination of Jews. which was found to have constituted the crime of 
"persecution" as defined by the Charter of the International Military Tribunal.”130 Thus the 
Tribunal was not making any great extensions of international law, at least not anymore so than 
had been done previously at Tribunals. Especially in light of the fact that Rwanda requested help 
handling the cases, and that no new law was created for the Tribunal, the sovereignty of Rwanda 
was not clearly lessened by the creation of the Tribunal, and none of the laws at the Tribunal 
were created strictly for the prosecution of Rwandan citizens. Thus, while Baehr claims Rwanda 
was “singled out”131, the laws were already relevant at the time of the Tribunal. Certainly, many 
elements of the Tribunal were not controlled by Rwandans or local structures but the fact that 
Rwanda requested assistance, yet voted against the Resolution that established the Tribunal, 
makes this more complex than a clear limitation on state sovereignty.  
The Tribunal did however, extend the definition of genocide to include rape.  “In 
September 1998, the Rwandan Tribunal rendered an historic judgment in Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul 
Akayesu, becoming the first international criminal tribunal to define rape as an act of 
genocide.”132 The judgement explains that the inclusion of rape as a means of genocide was 
pertinent as the acts of rape and sexual violence against Tutsi women amounted to “infliction of 
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serious bodily and mental harm on members of said group.”133 Rape is not explicitly spelled out 
as a means of genocide in the Genocide Convention, but the way that it is written leaves room 
for interpretation in what can be considered as harm against a group with intent to destroy. While 
rape is explicitly outlined as a crime against humanity134 the Tribunal was furthering the 
application and interpretation of international law by also using rape as evidence of genocidal 
intent. What this means for the power of the Tribunal, and by extension the Security Council is 
that the Tribunal has relative autonomy, similar to a domestic court over citizens, in interpreting 
and applying the law. Notably, it is the creation of the Tribunal that is in the Security Council’s 
hands, not the judgements handed down, yet the judges are nominated from a list that the 
Security Council creates. It seems though, that as the judges and Trial Chambers can still act 
with relative autonomy the countries that sit on the Security Council have limited power over 
sentencing.  
 In comments about the establishment of the Tribunal from members of the Security 
Council, the representative from Argentina noted that  “a standing international tribunal, in order 
to be established as legitimate and effective, should be the result of a treaty agreed among 
sovereign States”.135 Argentina also noted that the Tribunal was not to create new international 
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law but “apply existing international law”.136  In addition, the same representative claimed that 
the tribunal was being created in response to  “a specific request made by the Rwandese 
Government for rapid and effective action in this direction to contribute to reconciliation and 
reconstruction and to the maintenance of peace in Rwanda.”137 It is interesting to note then that 
at the time, Rwanda was a rotating member of the Security Council, and voted against 
Resolution 955. China, while not voting against the resolution abstained from voting. This is 
interesting to consider in light of the reservations that China expressed with the the establishment 
of the ICTY. The representative explained that China was “not in favour of invoking at will 
Chapter VII of the Charter to establish an international tribunal through the adoption of a 
Security Council resolution.”138 In addition, it was noted that the cooperation of Rwanda was 
necessary for the tribunal to deliver true justice, and that the concerns of Rwanda should be taken 
into “consideration”. 139 
 Rwanda outlined a list of concerns and amongst these were a desire for the dates of 
crimes to be considered for trial to be extended. In addition, Rwanda felt it was important for the 
tribunal to have a separate Appeals Chamber and Prosecutor, but the Resolution had the ICTR 
sharing these with the ICTY. Rwanda also felt that the “seat” of the tribunal should be located in 
Rwanda- but the location was still undecided at the time of the meeting during which Resolution 
955 was voted on. Rwanda also noted that the Tribunal departed from domestic legal code 
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because of its exclusion of the death penalty.140 What is interesting about this claim is that it 
expresses a concern over what is usually concerned a power of national government. The move 
to keep the death penalty out of the tribunal and the Security Council’s ability to limit the date 
range for consideration at the tribunal, and relative independence in establishing the location of 




Sovereignty has thus evolved over the course of the 20th century, from one in which 
territory was regarded as sufficient to ensure sovereignty, to one in which territorial sovereignty 
is no longer relevant. State boundaries serve as more convenient demarcators for issues such as 
jurisdiction and trade, but they can be disregarded in order to achieve a common goal in the 
international community. The question to ask ourselves then is what type of sovereignty remains 
and is a new conceptualization of sovereignty needed for how we view sovereignty out of and 
within the human rights regime?  
By evaluating all three of these tribunals, it is possible to see how sovereignty within the 
human rights regime has evolved. Each tribunal has provided an opportunity to re-cast 
sovereignty, in both the way the Tribunals are established, and the lasting normative effect the 
tribunal may or may not have on the way sovereignty is regarded within the international 
community. What is evident is that some aspects of sovereignty have been maintained over the 
20th century while others have not. While the IMT set the stage for a new kind of international 
tribunal, and was created at the outset of the human rights movement of the 20th century and the 
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creation of the U.N., it maintained certain aspects of sovereignty that the ICTY and ICTR did 
not. Concern during the establishment of the IMT still centered on territory. As displayed by 
Fried’s notes received by Telford Taylor after the IMT, Germany had abdicated territorial control 
in defeat to the Allies, who then occupied Germany. What this supports is that the somewhat 
“old-school” aspect of Westphalian sovereignty was maintained, in that territorial control was 
implied in the sovereign power. What was not maintained in the IMT was sovereign immunity or 
protection from trial. On the other hand, in the ICTY and ICTR the Security Council did not 
have territorial control of the areas in question. This set a precedent in how sovereignty was 
defined: control of the tribunal was done by countries outside of the territory, who were not 
directly involved in the conflict, and who did not “win” control of the area. If there was any 
notion left of a Westphalian sovereignty, any remaining fragment of that “iron curtain”141 was 
clearly brought down by the Security Council. In the same vein as the IMT, both tribunals did 
not acknowledge sovereign immunity, so this reformation has been maintained throughout the 
regime. This study has shown that while certain elements of sovereignty have been reformed 
within the human rights regime, not all of these reformations can be traced back to the IMT, as 
the element of territorial control for sovereign power was still regarded.  
It is clear that the idea of a “contingent sovereignty” is consistent with the defense for 
establishing the tribunals formed by the UN. However, concerns over traditional sovereignty are 
still evident in the comments by some countries, and Rwanda’s concern about the seat of the 
Tribunal show that some aspect of territorial claim is still an important consideration for some 
countries. Indeed, for some of the “weaker” countries this may be a concept that is important to 
hold onto, because of the ability of “stronger” countries to intervene. The demands placed on 
other countries in the statutes of the ICTY and ICTR, which was not something that was 
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necessary for the Allies to do in the case of the IMT, highlight another aspect of sovereignty that 
has not been retained in the regime: namely, that of an isolationist policy in regards to state 
sovereignty. In the current incarnation of the regime, state sovereignty is retained when a nation-
state cooperates and abides with the norms established by other similar political powers. The 
previous ability for a state to isolate itself from other nation-states would now put that state at 
risk of losing its “full” sovereignty. The sovereign power receives that authority not just from the 
people of the nation-state, but also from the international community and through cooperation 
with international norms. Hobbes’ “common-wealth” has expanded to include a more 
interconnected nation-state system.  
In putting articles in the statute of the tribunals that demanded cooperation and active 
involvement in the collection of evidence and persons relevant to the ICTR and ICTY the 
Security Council did not just establish a greater sovereign power over the countries relevant to 
the tribunals, but also to other countries in the UN.  Hence Bodley’s claim that “establishing the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia meant that the institution of state 
sovereignty was weakened a little for most of the world’s states-but it was probably strengthened 
for five”.142 What this means is that sovereignty is no longer a legitimate concept to invoke an 
isolationist policy,  and that sovereignty has become a much more interconnected concept. 
 Interestingly, while the IMT established new codified international law, thereby 
representing the Allies as the sovereign power, the ICTY and ICTR was expressly intended not 
to establish new laws. In this way the IMT moved away from traditional sovereignty, while the 
ICTR and ICTY made sure to protect it and ensure accountability was only enforced for crimes 
that were already established. This suggests that while sovereignty was limited within the regime 
                                                
142 Bodley, Anne. "Weakening the Principle of Sovereignty in International Law..”. 470-471.  
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to deliver accountability, once the establishing countries were a wider group than those that were 
directly involved in the conflict preceding the Tribunal, there was still concern amongst the 
international community to preserve basic aspects of sovereignty. This could be due in part to the 
fact that the power of the Allies was highly concentrated as opposed to those countries in the 
UN, who might also be concerned that a future Tribunal would affect their own citizens. So 
sovereignty has returned, at least in one respect to a more traditional conceptualization.  
 This is further supported by the unique way that Rwanda was positioned during the 
establishment of the ICTR. Rwanda asked for the establishment of a court, in order to hold trials 
to have some type of reconciliation begin,143 yet they were also rotating members of the Security 
Council when the resolution that established the ICTR was put to vote. This created a unique 
situation in that Rwanda voted against the Tribunal, apparently because it would actually deliver 
less in terms of accountability and prosecution than what was hoped for. This is interesting 
because while part of the reason the ICTY was not treaty based according to the Secretary-
General was to ensure that nation-states could not avoid ratification,144 in the case of the ICTR, 
the proceedings prefered by Rwanda would likely have been much more severe. The fact that 
Rwanda desired the death penalty to be an option for the Tribunal to hand down, like the 
domestic courts in Rwanda, further highlights that the ability of a nation-state to isolate itself, 
citing sovereign power, is no longer a defense in the international community. This further 
suggests that the isolationist policy of sovereignty has been outlawed in the interconnected 
                                                
143 See: UNSC Provisional Verbatim Record of the 3453rd Meeting. 8. 
In which the representative from Argentina notes the request from the Rwandese Government 
In addition, to the mention from: Schabas, William A. Genocide in International Law:The Crimes of Crimes. 345. 
 
144 UNSC “Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of the Security Council Resolution 808.” 7.  
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community that represents nation-states within the normative framework of the human rights 
regime. Abiding with these norms is necessary to maintain sovereignty with the 
 acceptance of nation-states. Perhaps, this is best seen in the statement of Resolution 955, that the 
creation of the ICTR was to “strengthen the courts and judicial system of Rwanda”145 and the 
claim by the representative from Nigeria (Gambari) in comments at the establishment of the 
ICTR, that it was “designed not to replace, but to complement, the sovereignty of Rwanda”.146 
Getting “up to scruff” on the norms and implementing them should help a nation-state become 
fully sovereign in the eyes of the international community, although this certainly represents a 
shift in the way sovereignty is regarded, as the very nature of being sovereign used to mean the 
right to choose to act or not act in parallel with other nation-states.  
In spite of these reformations, the way sovereignty is regarded is dynamic, and may not 
even be standard for all players in the international community. I return to Schmitt’s definition of 
sovereignty because it accurately represents that the sovereign power is established through not 
just legal power, but also the political. I make this claim, because as observed, the “exception” 
may not always be codified (in fact it runs contrary to the idea of “exception”) and in this case 
political power may be the deciding factor for how complete sovereign power really is. It is this 
nexus from which the theoretical problems of sovereignty within the human rights regime arise.  
By having the ability to extend the UN Charter to allow for establishment of the 
Tribunals the P5 is in a position to decide the state of exception. Even disregarding the definition 
of sovereignty as a state of exception, sovereignty within the regime is left with a theoretical 
problem: not all aspects of sovereignty are maintained for all nation-states. It’s no news to 
                                                
145 This can be found on page two of Resolution 955: 
UNSC Res .955. 2.  
 
146 UNSC Provisional Verbatim Record of the 3453rd Meeting. 13.  
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human rights activists and academics alike that countries such as the United States or Russia 
have a greater insulation against outside forces that may undermine sovereignty than countries 
like Rwanda (notice that while Rwanda’s desire to implement the death penalty in the Tribunal 
was turned down, the US still has the death penalty). Stronger countries not only maintain their 
territorial sovereignty but can also have political sway over other countries. What has emerged 
then in the human rights regime is a system in which some nation-states have “more” 
sovereignty than others, which seems counterintuitive to the very notion of sovereignty. If we 
regard the ability to establish an exception outside of what has been legally codified as a power 
reserved for whatever loci is the sovereign, whether this be a government, or ruler, etc. then only 
the P5 have maintained full sovereignty. Regardless, it is evident that within the regime some 
states have “lesser” sovereignty while others have “more” or are the only states who are 
sovereign. The problem with this is that those that have maintained the traditional aspects can 
still evade accountability because of the political power that allows them to retain full 
sovereignty.  
Sovereignty will continue to be re-defined with the growth and evolution of the human 
rights regime, and as nation-states become more connected. Moving forward I predict 
sovereignty will continue to become more centralized within the regime to a small group of 
countries, that while not controlling greater amounts of territory will have the political power to 
retain sovereignty and validate strong actions by citing international norms, such as those that 
have been created with the establishment of discussed tribunals. It is important to note that the 
arguments being used in the establishment of the ICTY and ICTR place a much heavier 
emphasis on human rights and the need to prevent further violations, while the emphasis in the 
IMT focused on war crimes and crimes against humanity, although genocide was not yet 
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codified in the IMT.  It is especially evident that the emphasis was more in line with the human 
rights regime in the move to keep the death penalty out of the ICTR. Countries like China have 
expressed concern over the establishment of international tribunals, and will likely continue to do 
so unless the tribunals are met with agreement from the relevant countries or the General 
Assembly. Protection of international peace is likely to be used as justification, much the way it 
was in Rwanda and Yugoslavia. While this means that they have not fully consented to the 
changing norms within the regime, it also suggests that the formation of tribunals might be left at 
the discretion of a wider body of nation-states, such as the General Assembly, if enough 
countries protest the capabilities of the Security Council. Although not speaking to the role of the 
Tribunals, Mexico noted in a General Assembly meeting that national sovereignty should be 
protected and considered even when international justice is being pursued: “This community of 
nations now wishes to internationalize certain issues which in earlier times fell exclusively 
within the internal jurisdiction of States. Mexico, as a country aware of its international 
responsibilities, is acting within the requirements of the new consensuses. But we must repeat 
time and again that we reject the idea of international action developing to the detriment of 
national sovereignty.”147 
In a somewhat unexpected turn of events, we see that while some aspects of sovereignty 
have been declared outdated and even irrelevant or unimportant in the face of human rights 
violations, other aspects of sovereignty that were torn down by the IMT are making a comeback, 
and individual nation-states in the UN are beginning to push back and speak out for a need for 
greater regard for sovereignty. While the IMT was able to create new law, the ICTR and ICTY 
were confined within already codified law, and while territorial control was something present at 
                                                
147 This quote can be found on page 18 of the General Assembly Official Records for the 9th Plenary Meeting:  
UNGA (48th Session) 9th Plenary Meeting (29 September 1993), UN Doc A/48/PV. 9. p.18. 
<https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N93/866/35/PDF/N9386635.pdf?OpenElement>. 
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the IMT, particularly that the Allies had control of the territory, this is no longer as large of a 
concern in the human rights regime when it comes to establishing tribunals. In a similar vein, all 
of the Tribunals undermined isolationist principles of sovereignty, as well as the argument of 
sovereign immunity, while the ICTY and ICTR furthered the weakening of this principle more 
significantly than the IMT.  
The fact that international courts such as the ICC and ICJ are treaty based, unlike the 
tribunals of the 20th century, exemplify the way that sovereignty is being uniquely regarded and 
changed by the formation of these tribunals within the regime. They provide a catalyst for further 
refining and reforming state sovereignty, both within and outside of the legal order. The 
formation of these tribunals has created a new type of sovereignty within the human rights 
regime in which not all states are sovereign, and territorial control is no longer synonymous with 
sovereignty. In a speech by Louis Henkin at Fordham Law School, he claims that “The 
international human rights movement, born during the Second World War, has represented a 
significant erosion of state sovereignty”. 148 While in some ways the traditional concept of 
sovereignty has changed, evidence also suggests that a new type of sovereignty is emerging, and 
that nation-states in the UN may regard the principle of sovereignty with a higher regard in the 
future, yet this need not be antithetical to human rights. Indeed, as was seen in comments by 
Rwanda, strengthening sovereignty might even lead to a more extensive form of accountability 
in a nation-state, although on the flip side, there is always the risk that state sovereignty can be 
used to evade accountability. What the inquiry at hand has revealed though is that it may not be 
as simple to say that the concept of state sovereignty is being broken down or becoming a kind of 
                                                
148 Henkin, Louis. That "S" word: Sovereignty, and Globalization, and Human Rights, et cetera. Fordham Law 
Review 68.1 (1999): 4. Fordham University School of Law. HeinOnline. Web.  
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contingent sovereignty but rather that the human rights regime has fostered a reformation of 
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